

# The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict on the Current Migration Phenomenon

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## Abstract

*In recent decades, after the Second World War, we have become familiar with migration to Europe mainly for the purpose of work. In the European Union we have enjoyed the free movement of labour, goods, services and capital. But the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict revived in Europe the migration caused by the war, for humanitarian purposes or in other words, the struggle for security or survival of some human individuals is identified. Through this paper, we propose to analyze the impact that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has on the migration phenomenon, but also some contextual regional socio-economic effects.*

**Key words:** armed conflict, Ukrainian citizens, refugees, humanitarian, migration, regional socio-economic impact, labor force

**J.E.L. classification:** F22, O15, R23

## 1. Introduction

The free movement of labor, goods, services and capital are part of the scenario that allowed the European Union to evolve to a new level of development. After the Second World War, in the last few decades, we have become familiar with the fact that migration to Europe takes place mainly for the purpose of work. However, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict led us to follow and analyze the effects it has in the region and even worldwide.

Because one of the main effects of any armed conflict is that the affected population seeks refuge in areas where they feel safe, we appreciated that the migration phenomenon is the one that deserves our attention. Thus, in the first part of the paper, we captured some aspects of the migration phenomenon from the EU before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in order to have a first overview, in order to then analyze how the Ukrainian refugees contributed to the amplification of this phenomenon and from what perspectives, with what regional implications, so that in the end we come up with some relevant conclusions.

Our approaches on this plan have the following structure: (1) Introduction, (2) Theoretical/Research Background, (3) Research methodology, (4) Amplification of the migration phenomenon by Ukrainian citizens - effect of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, (5) Situations derived from the migration phenomenon, (6) Other effects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and (7) Conclusions. Obviously, briefly, at the end, Limits of the research and our future research directions are presented.

## 2. Theoretical background. An overview of the migration phenomenon within the European Union before the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Regarding the migratory flows registered in the EU space in the period before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, we highlight the fact that Eurostat, in 2010, for example, shows that „about 3.1 million people immigrated to one of the EU member states (see table no. 1), and at least 2.0 million people emigrated from an EU member state” (Eurostat, 2010). According to the same source, the EU policies in the field of migration, from the reference period, aimed to attract a certain profile of

migrant who would contribute to „fixing certain competence deficits”, focusing on the selection process „linguistic knowledge, professional experiences, education and age”.

The migration situation in European society, in 2020, reflects the fact that „1.92 million people immigrated to the EU, 0.96 million people emigrated from the EU, and the total net immigration in the EU registers the value of 0.96 million people” (European Commission, 2021). The European Commission, in statistical analyses, shows that „in 2020, the EU population decreased by approximately 100,000 people (from 447.3 million on January 1, 2020 to 447.2 million on January 1, 2021) and this is because have had fewer births, more deaths and less net migration” (European Commission, 2021), in a pandemic context, when travel restrictions were introduced to reduce the spread of the SARS CoV2 virus.

Table no. 1 Immigration by main citizenship groups, 2010

|                 | Total immigrants<br>(1 000) | Nationals  |           | Non-nationals |           |                                    |           |                                  |           |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------|
|                 |                             |            |           | Total         |           | Citizens of other EU Member States |           | Citizens of non-member countries |           |
|                 |                             | (1 000)    | (%)       | (1 000)       | (%)       | (1 000)                            | (%)       | (1 000)                          | (%)       |
| <b>EU-27</b>    | <b>3 100</b>                | <b>600</b> | <b>21</b> | <b>2 500</b>  | <b>79</b> | <b>1 000</b>                       | <b>31</b> | <b>1 500</b>                     | <b>48</b> |
| Belgium         | 131.2                       | 17.0       | 12.9      | 113.7         | 86.6      | 59.6                               | 45.4      | 54.1                             | 41.2      |
| Bulgaria        | ..                          | ..         | ..        | ..            | ..        | ..                                 | ..        | ..                               | ..        |
| Czech Republic  | 48.3                        | 18.3       | 37.8      | 30.1          | 62.2      | 14.8                               | 30.7      | 15.2                             | 31.5      |
| Denmark         | 52.2                        | 18.5       | 35.4      | 33.7          | 64.5      | 16.7                               | 31.9      | 17.0                             | 32.6      |
| Germany         | 404.1                       | 85.5       | 21.2      | 317.2         | 78.5      | 156.8                              | 38.8      | 160.4                            | 39.7      |
| Estonia         | 2.8                         | 1.6        | 57.3      | 1.2           | 42.6      | 0.5                                | 18.2      | 0.7                              | 24.4      |
| Ireland         | 39.5                        | 16.6       | 42.0      | 22.7          | 57.4      | 15.7                               | 39.8      | 7.0                              | 17.6      |
| Greece          | 119.1                       | 64.1       | 53.9      | 54.9          | 46.1      | 18.7                               | 15.7      | 36.2                             | 30.4      |
| Spain           | 465.2                       | 34.8       | 7.5       | 430.4         | 92.5      | 145.4                              | 31.2      | 285.0                            | 61.3      |
| France          | 251.2                       | 101.6      | 40.5      | 149.5         | 59.5      | 61.2                               | 24.4      | 88.4                             | 35.2      |
| Italy           | 458.9                       | 34.4       | 7.5       | 424.5         | 92.5      | 118.6                              | 25.8      | 305.9                            | 66.7      |
| Cyprus          | 20.2                        | 1.9        | 9.3       | 18.3          | 90.6      | 11.9                               | 58.9      | 6.4                              | 31.7      |
| Latvia          | 2.4                         | 0.3        | 10.7      | 2.1           | 89.3      | 0.8                                | 35.7      | 1.3                              | 53.6      |
| Lithuania       | 5.2                         | 4.2        | 79.7      | 1.1           | 20.3      | 0.1                                | 2.9       | 0.9                              | 17.5      |
| Luxembourg      | 17.0                        | 1.1        | 6.8       | 15.7          | 92.8      | 12.6                               | 74.2      | 3.2                              | 18.6      |
| Hungary (2)     | 27.9                        | 2.3        | 8.3       | 25.6          | 91.7      | 14.2                               | 51.1      | 11.3                             | 40.6      |
| Malta           | 8.2                         | 1.2        | 14.6      | 7.0           | 85.3      | 6.3                                | 76.4      | 0.7                              | 8.9       |
| Netherlands (2) | 128.8                       | 36.9       | 28.7      | 81.9          | 63.6      | 47.3                               | 36.7      | 34.6                             | 26.8      |
| Austria         | 73.9                        | 8.7        | 11.7      | 65.1          | 88.2      | 41.3                               | 56.0      | 23.8                             | 32.2      |
| Poland          | ..                          | ..         | ..        | ..            | ..        | ..                                 | ..        | ..                               | ..        |
| Portugal        | 27.6                        | 19.7       | 71.5      | 7.9           | 28.5      | 2.4                                | 8.7       | 5.5                              | 19.8      |
| Romania         | ..                          | ..         | ..        | ..            | ..        | ..                                 | ..        | ..                               | ..        |
| Slovenia        | 15.4                        | 2.7        | 17.6      | 12.7          | 82.1      | 2.0                                | 13.1      | 10.6                             | 69.0      |
| Slovakia        | 13.8                        | 1.1        | 8.1       | 12.7          | 91.9      | 6.0                                | 43.3      | 6.7                              | 48.6      |
| Finland         | 25.6                        | 7.4        | 29.0      | 17.9          | 69.8      | 7.1                                | 27.7      | 10.8                             | 42.1      |
| Sweden          | 98.8                        | 19.8       | 20.0      | 78.7          | 79.6      | 24.2                               | 24.4      | 54.5                             | 55.2      |
| United Kingdom  | 591.0                       | 93.3       | 15.8      | 497.6         | 84.2      | 176.0                              | 29.8      | 321.7                            | 54.4      |
| Iceland         | 3.9                         | 1.7        | 42.5      | 2.3           | 57.5      | 1.7                                | 42.5      | 0.6                              | 15.0      |
| Liechtenstein   | 0.6                         | 0.2        | 27.1      | 0.4           | 72.9      | 0.2                                | 39.9      | 0.2                              | 33.0      |
| Norway          | 69.2                        | 9.6        | 13.9      | 59.6          | 86.1      | 37.3                               | 53.8      | 22.3                             | 32.3      |
| Switzerland     | 161.8                       | 22.3       | 13.8      | 139.4         | 86.2      | 91.2                               | 56.4      | 48.2                             | 29.8      |

(1) EU-27 rounded totals are based on estimates; the individual values do not add up to the total due to rounding and the exclusion of the 'unknown' citizenship group from the table.

(2) 2009.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz)

Source: Eurostat

### 3. Research methodology

The approach to the aforementioned topic („The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict on the Current Migration Phenomenon”) is based on the investigation of several specialized works, which (and) due to the fact that the researched problem is relatively new (approx. one year), they are as recent as possible.

For the same purpose, we have resorted to analyzing the official documents of the European Commission, the EU Council and the European Council, the data provided by Eurostat, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but also national normative acts related to our topic. Among the latter we highlight those foundations and legislative provisions aimed at providing facilities for refugees from Ukraine.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1. Amplification of the migration phenomenon by Ukrainian citizens - effect of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has generated an impressive migration influx of millions of people seeking refuge and in this context the EU on 4 March 2022 activated the Temporary Protection Directive to support citizens on the territory of Ukraine.

An impressive number of people tried to ensure their security and took refuge, either by migrating from one region to another on the territory of Ukraine, or to EU states and the Republic of Moldova, or to Russia, despite the fact that the latter the state is precisely the attacker (Elisei, 2014). According to Arthur Elisei, in the work *The Russia-Ukraine Conflict*, „On March 1, 2014, the Duma (Russian Parliament) approved Vladimir Putin's request to use force in Ukraine to «protect Russia's interests».... Starting from March 1, 2014, armed persons, in uniforms without insignia, took control of some strategic points in the Crimean peninsula.” Hostilities continued, and here in December 2022 the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict is in full swing, after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, November 22, 2022), 7.9 million refugees from Ukraine are registered across Europe, and 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine are registered for temporary protection or a similar regime in the EU. Thus, Europe is facing the largest migration since the Second World War.

In the context of the military aggression, the EU offered Ukraine support on multiple humanitarian-political-financial-material levels, support that concretely presents itself as follows (European Council, 2022, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022):

- „a temporary protection mechanism for people fleeing war;
- 523 million euros in the form of humanitarian aid;
- Support for civil protection granted to Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- financial and technical support for member states hosting refugees;
- support for border management for EU countries and the Republic of Moldova”.

Among the states included in the Response Plan for refugees, in addition to those already nominated, there are at least Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. It is worth highlighting the numerical picture of Ukrainian citizens involved in the fluctuating migration process (*Table no. 2*).

*Table no. 2 Countries featured in the Refugee Response Plan*

| Country             | Refugees from Ukraine registered for Protection | Refugees from Ukraine recorded in country | Border crossings from Ukraine* | Border crossings to Ukraine** |
|---------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Poland              | 1,521,085                                       | 1,521,085                                 | 7,885,885                      | 5,806,156                     |
| Czech Republic      | 464,701   | 464,910                                   | Not applicable                 | Not applicable                |
| Slovakia            | 102,278   | 102,476                                   | 970,667                        | 705,384                       |
| Republic of Moldova | Not applicable                                  | 96,913                                    | 706,906                        | 348,335                       |
| Romania             | 90,348  | 94,526                                    | 1,589,800                      | 1,265,900                     |
| Bulgaria            | 146,659   | 51,516                                    | Not applicable                 | Not applicable                |
| Hungary             | 32,271  | 32,271                                    | 1,812,974                      | Data not available            |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>2,357,342</b>                                | <b>2,363,697</b>                          | <b>12,966,232</b>              | <b>8,125,775</b>              |

Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ukraine refugee situation, [online] Available at: <<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>>, [accessed on November 30, 2022]

Analyzing the data from *Table no. 2*, we find that Poland experiences the largest flow of migrants who have commuted between the country of origin and Poland. Thus, the significant percentage of 60.82% of Ukrainian citizens, out of the total number of migrants represented in *Table no. 2*, who left Ukraine and entered the territory of Poland. 7,885,885 citizens entered Poland from Ukraine through various border points, and 5,806,156 Ukrainian citizens returned from Poland to Ukraine (according to the previously indicated sources). So it follows that out of the

difference of 2,079,729 Ukrainians who did not return to Ukraine, only 1,521,085 registered in Poland as Ukrainian refugees for temporary protection or similar national protection schemes. Thus, a significant number of Ukrainian migrants went to other states in the European Union (Union whose states face labor shortages and which offer them opportunities in this regard) and to a lesser extent, to countries such as Canada, the USA or Israel. New arrivals find work more easily and quickly than previous groups of refugees, yet there is uncertainty for both parties (employers / employees) as to how long they will stay, combined with obstacles such as language, cultural and qualification recognition barriers and childcare responsibilities, which have led many to prioritize any job, whether skilled or unskilled (Desiderio and Hooper, 2022).

It is necessary to emphasize that the figures regarding migrants are constantly changing and that the data in our analysis were provided on November 29, 2022 (with the exception of the data provided by Romania which was reported on November 27, 2022). Thus, the figures recorded in Poland (to which I referred previously) are followed by a percentage of 13.98% of migrants who went to Hungary and then 12.26% of Ukrainians who migrated to Romania. If no data is available for Hungary, from Romania, 1,265,900 Ukrainian citizens returned to their country of origin, Ukraine, 94,526 registered as refugees in Romania, 90,348 benefiting from temporary protection or similar national protection schemes, and the rest we understand they have gone to other destination states. Finally, while Poland has the highest number of registered Ukrainian refugees, Hungary has the lowest number of Ukrainian refugees (32,271) who have registered for protection.

Beyond the European states, EU member states, Belarus, Russia's ally, constituted a favorable environment for migration for the Ukrainian population. However, it cannot be ignored that a significant number of Ukrainian citizens (2,852,395) migrated to the Russian Federation, and 17,209 registered as refugees in Belarus, as shown in *Table no. 3*.

*Table no. 3 Other countries neighbouring Ukraine*

| Country            | Refugees from Ukraine registered for Protection | Refugees from Ukraine recorded in country | Border crossings from Ukraine* | Border crossings to Ukraine** |
|--------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Russian Federation | Not applicable                                  | 2,852,395                                 | 2,852,395                      | Data not available            |
| Belarus            | Not applicable                                  | 17,209                                    | 16,705                         | Data not available            |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>Not applicable</b>                           | <b>2,869,604</b>                          | <b>2,869,100</b>               | <b>Data not available</b>     |

Source: UN high Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ukraine refugee situation, [online] Available at: <<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>>, [Accessed on November 30, 2022]

In this context, some questions arise regarding the migration option selected by a part of Ukrainian citizens for which we aim to find, to some extent, answers:

- What are the reasons why Poland is facing the largest influx of Ukrainian migrants?
- Why Romania?
- What causes the citizens of an attacked state (Ukraine) to migrate precisely to the state that caused the conflict (Russia)?

#### 4.2. The motivation of the major influx of Ukrainian to Poland

First, as we detailed in one of the previous paragraphs, we must not lose sight of the fact that Poland, together with other EU member states, as well as the Republic of Moldova participates in the implementation of the EU Response Plan for refugees that ensures the protection mechanism temporary and humanitarian aid.

If a decade ago Poland was not considered a country of immigration, in recent years, in addition to other states of Central and Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, as a member state of the EU it is no longer only a state of migration but also immigration and transit, thus, if some citizens of this state migrate to Western Europe, the same country becomes a destination for migrants from Belarus and Ukraine. (Tudorache, p. 97) Here, a custom related to the migration of Ukrainians to Poland since before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as Ukraine's proximity to Poland, the two states having a common border of approximately 530 km with 11 border crossing points since 2012 (Frontiera Polonia - Ucraina, 2022), can constitute premises of the influx of Ukrainian migration in the midst of the Russian-

Ukrainian conflict. Ukrainian citizens who emigrated to Poland even before the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out in 2022, could constitute real anchors for family members who had to take shelter from the dangers generated by the war and flee from them.

A larger number of citizens on the territory of any state has effects on the public institutions of the receiving state, demanding a greater involvement of the staff, as well as its increase with the multiplication of the workload. Currently, in addition to registering impressive numbers of refugees (mostly women and children who apparently preferred to stay close to the mother country), Poland is witnessing a pattern of mobility that is somewhat similar to the reality of pre-2022 migration between Ukraine and Poland which included a large number of temporary migrants commuting for work, regularly, between the two countries, it being not possible to estimate the extent of the phenomenon due to insufficient data. (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk 2022, pp. 164-170)

#### 4.3. Why Romania?

Romania, as a member state of the EU and a neighboring state of Ukraine, has a common border in the North and the East that stretches over a distance of 649,4 km (The Consulate General of Romania in New York) and in accordance with the Protocol concluded between the Government of Romania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine there are several border points of which 3 from *Table no. 4* are located on the northern border of Romania. We will include in the table only those with international status.

*Table no. 4 Open points for crossing the Romanian-Ukrainian state border*

| <i>No. Crt.</i> | <i>Denomination</i>           | <i>Traffic</i>   |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1               | Halmeu - Diakove              | Car and rail, people and goods                             |
| 2               | Siret - Porubne               | Car and pedestrian, people and goods                       |
| 3               | Valea Vişeuului - Dilove      | Rail, people and goods                                     |
| 4               | Câmpulung la Tisa - Teresva   | Rail, people and goods                                     |
| 5               | Vişani Vadul Siret            | Rail, people and goods                                     |
| 6               | Sighetu Marmaţiei - Solotvino | Car, pedestrian, people, and goods weighing up to 3.5 tons |

*Source:* The protocol concluded between the Government of Romania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for the amendment of the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine regarding the conditions of mutual travel of citizens, signed in Kyiv on December 19, 2003, adopted/published on 07.04.2006

If the number of refugees from Ukraine increases, both the Romanian and Ukrainian sides show that they are ready for the opening of new border points. Thus, on November 10, 2022, a new road crossing point for the border with Ukraine was inaugurated in Romania, at Vikovu de Sus, Suceava county, against the background of the intensification of Russian military actions and in case of the need to evacuate the capital Kyiv (Horşia, S., 2022).

According to the Romanian government (Romanian Government, 2022), with the introduction of the temporary protection mechanism by the European Commission, for refugees from Ukraine, both Ukrainian citizens and citizens of third countries located on the territory of Ukraine, can enter the territory of Romania, they can benefit from protection for the period of one year, a period that can be extended by six months, for a maximum period of one year. According to the same source and under the conditions of the regulations in force, on the territory of Romania, refugees from Ukraine benefit from the rights of „assistance necessary for maintenance, in the situation where do not have the necessary material means, emergency hospital medical assistance, as well as free medical assistance and treatment in cases of acute or chronic diseases that put life in imminent danger”, which is realized, mainly, through facilities such as:

- Accommodation in spaces provided by the state or at available private units/people, the expenses on food, hygiene products and clothing being provided from funds allocated by the state and from donations;

- Upon request, the refugees from Ukraine who want to settle in Romania are provided with the state allowance for children, social aid, family support allowance, if they meet the eligibility conditions according to the legal regulations in force;
- Free medical assistance and appropriate treatment for emergency situations;
- The Ukrainian refugees who wish to secure sources of income from work, without needing an employment permit, can be employed under an IEC (Individual Employment Contract) for nine months of a calendar year;
- Refugees with *disabilities, the elderly and people who benefit from international protection can benefit from various forms of support such as: „protected housing, training centers for independent living, empowerment and rehabilitation centers, care and assistance centers, crisis centers”*;
- *Refugee children from Ukraine have access to education in Romania, under the same conditions that Romanian students benefit from, being mainly provided with: accommodation in boarding schools, allowance for food, medical assistance, supplies, clothing, shoes, textbooks;*
- *within the limit of 20% of the schooling capacity allocated by ARACIS, the Ministry of Education can approve the addition of the number of places for refugee students from Ukraine who wish to continue their studies;*
- *based on the status of the unaccompanied minor, children from Ukraine who arrive unaccompanied in Romania benefit from protection, through the Operative Group for Unaccompanied Children which ensures an integrated intervention, adopting the most appropriate measure for the minor.*

For example, as presented by UNHCR (Burks, 2022), art therapy, sculpture, music, drawing or dance classes are some of the activities in which some Ukrainian refugee children and/or young people participate/have participated in a safe space for Ukrainian refugees, of a community organizations from Bucharest, the capital of Romania. Participating in such activities, the escape of children and the solidarity they benefit from is a momentary solution for Ukrainian refugee children/youth having the chance to communicate and share experiences and feelings in a diverse informal setting, but although the participants feel good in such a space (of which it is known that there are many others in Romania), dreams of „home” and of returning to Ukraine where they will be able to meet their father again. Home and family, the trauma of separation and flight from war, are in the mind of every refugee, adult or child, and the humanity, the support, the momentary well-being that these children/young people benefit from in such a center represents a solution framework „here and now” and not a viable long-term solution (Burks, 2022).

#### **4.4. Why are so many citizens migrating to Russia?**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the migration phenomenon was preserved between Russia and the newly independent states, but over time, the migration ties between Russia and them, in general, weakened, and the predictions made did not seem to have a positive trend, not even for Russia, nor for countries in the region. (Denisenko, 2017, p. 10)

However, against the background of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the neighborhood, the border that delimits the two states, the common history that the two entities have shared, the similar culture and linguistic components, the degree of kinship between some Ukrainian citizens and other Russians, constitute premises strong for a Ukrainian citizen to migrate to Russia (2,852,395 Ukrainian migrants, according to UNHCR, data recorded as of October 3, 2022). All of the above can be sufficient reasons for any Ukrainian citizen to join the attacker's camp, or even more so, to share the same reasons that led to the outbreak of the war. This if we take into account Russia's previous policy (The one that dates back to at least 2014, when the Duma, the Russian Parliament, approved Vladimir Putin's request to use force in Ukraine to „protect Russia's interests”), as well as the current one, which is motivated and legitimized by the fear of Western expansionism that could have subversive effects on the spiritual integrity of the Russian nation (Morozov, 2017, pp. 5-6), and more.

In addition to causing thousands of deaths and amplifying the phenomenon of migration, Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has given rise to large-scale economic imbalances worldwide, prompting the EU to take measures to respond to this challenge in order to protect its own security and democratic values, and at the Versailles Summit (March 10-11, 2022), EU leaders decided on a three-dimensional vision regarding (1) strengthening European economic resilience, (2) reducing energy imports from Russia and (3) strengthening European defense. (EEAS, 2022)

Looking ahead, both the integration trajectory and the ability of governments to track results will be complicated by the secondary movements of this population [allowed under TPD (Temporary Protection Directive) status] and circular movements to and from Ukraine. (Desiderio and Hooper, 2022)

#### 4.5. Conjunctures derived from the migration phenomenon

The migration phenomenon that has increased in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is characterized by both advantages and disadvantages for the communities in the region and implicitly for their citizens, especially for Ukrainian citizens. We present, in the following, some of them:

##### *Advantages:*

- ✓ the humanitarian spirit and support offered to Ukrainian citizens by the states that share a common border with Ukraine, as well as by other EU states, but not only, encouraged Ukrainian citizens to migrate to them;
- ✓ the fact that NATO, in the context of the armed conflict, supports Ukraine, which is a NATO „partner country” since 2008, gave courage to Ukrainian citizens for fluctuating migration, i.e. to oscillate between the host state (of migration) and the state of origin (Ukraine);
- ✓ The European Union came to the support of Ukrainian citizens and activated for them the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), a directive with a protective role and which allowed the provision of facilities to Ukrainian refugees on several levels: humanitarian, political, material and financial, to which we did detailed reference in the preceding paragraphs, context in which Ukrainian citizens had the confidence to migrate to EU member states;
- ✓ the relatively easy access for Ukrainian refugees to the labor market from the level of the EU member states, in the context in which they face a certain labor force deficit, is another element that has encouraged migration;
- ✓ the financial resources that they save in the state of migration, could be sent to the country of origin to serve the family members who remained in the country of birth and why not, could be used, someday, even in the reconstruction of Ukraine (piece by piece);

##### *Disadvantages:*

- ❖ the uncertain evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict determines the need to define multiple strategic scenarios of states facing labor shortages in order to prevent and/or counteract the numerical and temporal unpredictability of a fluctuating part of the labor force originating from Ukraine (the population is considered fluctuating, precisely due to the oscillation between the state(s) of migration and the state of origin during peacetime/small or non-existent Russian armed turbulence); this context causes migration states to continuously monitor the evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and to constantly adapt to the factors generated by the conflict;
- ❖ loss of income of the Ukrainian state and its citizens as a result of the temporary non-use of labor force, skills or their partial use by Ukrainian citizens; this situation may lead to the definitive loss of valuable professionals by the Ukrainian state, but may represent an immeasurable benefit to the state of migration of Ukrainian citizens if it experiences a labor shortage; however, even under these conditions, it is possible for Ukrainian refugees to integrate professionally in a field in which they do not utilize their skills to their full capacity, there is also the possibility of carrying out their activity in fields for which the skills they possess are not necessary, this if we have considering language and cultural barriers; of course, Ukrainian refugees can adapt to the new conditions, but adaptation

requires time, SMART programs of integration/preparation, will and sustained commitment from both sides;

- ❖ there is a possibility that some adolescent Ukrainian refugees may have to be employed early in the state they migrated to, due to linguistic and cultural integration barriers (except for states that have common or at least close linguistic and cultural elements) or due to factors of social order and, respectively, financial and material needs, thus neglecting the education necessary for a quality professional life; it is also possible that this category of refugees will not return to their country of origin, and if this happens, we can again identify young people with an intermediate level of professional training and, respectively, with insufficiently developed skills; all of these depend to a great extent on the integration programs offered by each of the host states, but also on the potential of each teenager; however, the experience gained in the state that hosted them can offer new linguistic, cultural and even socio-professional perspectives;
- ❖ the eventual „reconstruction” of Ukraine, after the end of the conflict, may register slower progress if we consider the impossibility or reduced possibility of participation in it by Ukrainian citizens who have migrated to other states.

#### **4.6. Other effects of the Russian- Ukrainian conflict**

Additionally, in addition to the amplification of the migration phenomenon by citizens from the territory of the states involved in the conflict, especially from the territory of Ukraine, the armed conflict generated many other effects, both on Ukrainian citizens and foreigners temporarily located on the territory of Ukraine, as well as for the states in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine and their citizens, but not only. Here are some of those effects: ► thousands of deaths of citizens directly or indirectly involved in the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, either of Ukrainian and/or Russian nationality, or of other nationalities who for professional purposes or in another context were in the territory affected by the conflict; ► the destruction of some human settlements in communities directly involved in the armed conflict, but also of the industrial, transport infrastructure, etc.; ► the security and democratic values of the EU states, but not only, are tested or tried on the occasion of this conflict; ► economic losses recorded by the partner entities, through the departure of multiple international reference companies from Russia, the interruption of strategic economic partnerships, the termination of commercial contracts concluded by Russia with third countries, except for countries such as Belarus and China, for example; ► large-scale economic-social imbalances worldwide, which had as their main causes: ▪ suspension, interruption or delay in the delivery of some products and/or raw materials from Ukraine to third countries; ▪ the increase in the cost of goods exported by Ukraine, by means of transport other than the naval one; ▪ redefining strategies for strengthening European economic resilience; ▪ the relocation of budget funds for defense consolidation, by strengthening the defense infrastructure and human resources at the borders, the creation of new border crossing points, but also the increase of support at the level of institutional structures with a major role in ensuring security, defense and migration; ▪ increase in energy costs as a result of the reduction/cease of imports of energy from Russia by the EU and reorientation to other markets; ► there are signs that the Russian economy will register less favorable indicators than in previous years, considering the value fluctuations of the Russian national currency (the ruble), the values recorded by the inflation index, the difficulties of the Moscow Stock Exchange, the risk of Russia's dependence on China.

#### **5. Conclusions**

The way of approaching our theme leads to the conclusive idea that the European Union, under the pressure of events, prepared to respond to the challenges launched by the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. An issue of major importance, namely whether there are migration and asylum policies in the EU states that allow the optimal integration of Ukrainian refugees, has caused us to make a series of relatively brief references and from which it does not follow that the most good practical solutions.



It is true that, in the face of the humanitarian crisis that arose on the background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, any help from any state is vital and much more than "no helping hand", but future developments in the integration of Ukrainian refugees will be talkative; for the moment, the feedback is, to a certain extent, positive, and for example, there are already signals that some of them are already active in the labor market in their host states.

But until a satisfactory solution the distance is long. The situation is conditioned by political, social and, most importantly, financial/material factors. Or, in the context of the other crises that act simultaneously: health, financial, energy, supply circuits, etc. (aside from the geostrategic crisis), with certainty, the difficulties we referred to in the paper will not be removed anytime soon.

**The limits of the research** – are given by the fact that the work is far from exhaustive, the analyzed problems having appeared relatively recently. This also explains the small number of similar works in the scientific offer. Moreover, as I have shown, the uncertain evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict determines the need to define multiple strategic scenarios for states facing labor shortages in order to prevent as much as possible the numerical and temporal unpredictability of a fluctuating part of the labor force from Ukraine.

**Our future research directions** – necessarily assume the passage of a longer period of time, possibly until the conflict is resolved in one way or another. However, we appreciate that this paper is only a starting point in the creation of more complete scientific articles, given the importance of the topic we have chosen for research, and which we believe will be of high interest for many years to come.

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